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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRIENDSHIP .MANOR
CORPORATION,
a l Ttah non-profit and
charitable corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

THE TAX COM.MISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH; EARL
l\I. BAKER, Salt Lake County
Assessor; SID LAMBOURNE, Salt
Lake County Treasurer; ROY AL K.
HUNT, OSCAR HANSON, JR.,
and PIIILLIP BLOMQUIST,
Commissioners of Salt Lake County,
Utah; and GLEN PAL.MER, Salt
Lake County Auditor,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
12145

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for declaratory judgment (1) that
plaintiff's lot and building located at 1320 East Fifth
I

South, Salt L.ake City, Utah, known as Friendship
l\'Ianor, are bemg used exclusively for charitable purposes within the meaning of Article XIII, Section 2
Utah Constitution and 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated
1953, so as to be exempt from ad valorem tax; ( 2) that
the Utah State Tax Commission has no power under the
Utah Constitution or statute to overrule a county determination that property is tax exempt or to direct the
county how to rule in the future; and ( 3) that if such
power exists the Tax Commission did not proceed in 11
legal and constitutional manner.

DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
After a trial, the court entered a memorandum decision (R. 279) that while the Tax Commission did not
exceed its authority in ordering the Salt Lake County
Assessor to place Friendship Manor on the tax rolls, the
(except for some apartments subject to separate
assessment) was used exclusively for charitable purposes
and was exempt from the ad valorem tax. Findings of '
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were entered accordingly. By the judgment, defendants were
ordered to assess and tax for the years 1968 and 1969
only those apartments occupied solely by persons under
62 years of age, not handicapped and not employed by
plaintiff to assist in the management and operation of
Friendship Manor.
2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the judgment insofar
a:, it determines that plaintiff's property is being used
exclusively for charitable purposes, but modification of
die judgment to provide that taxes may not be assessed
against any portion of plaintiff's property for the years
1968 and 1969.

STATElVIENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in defendants'
brief is incomplete. Defendants have included only those
facts which they feel support their theory of the case,
other material evidence being ignored. For that reason,
plaintiff will restate the facts. This is especially necesbecause defendants have underscored portions of
the transcript they deem favorable to their position.
Plaintiff was organized as a Utah non-profit corporation in lVIarch, 1963. The organization of plaintiff
and construction of a housing project for elderly persons was sponsored by four religious organizations: the
First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City; the First
Congregational Church of Salt Lake City, the Temple
B'N ai Israel of Salt Lake City, and the United Church
11
±' Christ Utah Association. Plaintiff's corporate purposes, as set forth in Article II of its Restated Articles
of Incorporation (Ex. P-1), are to provide senior citii'.ens and handicapped persons with housing facilities and
designed to meet their physical, social, psycho-
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logical and charitable needs and to promote their health,
security, hap pines and usefulness in longer living. Included in its Articles is the following:
" ( b) The corporation is irrevocably dedicated
to, and operated exclusively for, charitable and
non-profit purposes; and no part of the income
or assets of the corporation shall be distributed
to, nor inure to the benefit of, any individual, except such benefits as may inure to all tenants
through reduction of monthly charges. * * *"
To assure that plaintiff's property will not be used
for other than charitable purposes in the future, the
Articles also provide (Article III) that upon the winding up and dissolution of the corporation and after provision for all its debts and obligations "the remaining
assets shall be distributed to a non-profit fund, foundation, or corporation which is organized and operated exclusively for charitable, education, religious and/or scientific purposes and which has established its tax exempt
status under Section 501 ( c) ( 3) of the Internal Revenue
Code."
Plaintiff has been determined to be a charitable organization exempt from federal taxation under the
above provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (Ex. PIO,

R. 352).

In the organization of and planning for Friendship
Corporation, the sponsoring churches and mem·
hers donated their time and effort without compensation
(R. 341, 354). The sponsors or their members contribut·

4

eel ai-;p·oximately
in cash (R. 391) ..Members
of the board of trustees, who are elected by the sponsorir,g church organizations, serve on the board without
tion ( R. 341) . The manager of Friendship
}lanor and some other employees are paid a moderate
( R. 368, 397) .
The site acquisition and construction of Friendship
Jlanor as a housing facility for elderly persons was financed under the provisions of Section 231 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §1715v (R. 431-434).
In connection with the construction and commencement of operations, plaintiff executed a promissory note
in the amount of $3,317,600.00 secured by a mortgage
on the Friendship Manor property (Ex. D-25, D-26).
The note, which is insured by the FHA, is payable over
a period of 40 years at 514 % interest and 1/2 'lo FHA insurance charge (Ex. D-25) . Plaintiff also borrowed
$25,000.00 from Chuckrow Construction Company to
in commencing operations of Friendship Manor
(Ex. D-15, R. 456). This debt, evidenced by a promissory note, is payable after the mortgage is discharged
(R.456).
Before insuring the construction loan for Friendship .Manor, the FHA insisted as a condition of the insurance that plaintiff obtain from Salt Lake County a
prior determination that the proposed use would be tax
exempt ( R. 433). This determination ·was obtained and
rrovided to the FHA, which in reliance upon it insured
the construction loan ( R. 433) .
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The purchase of the site and contracts with the real
estate agents, architects, builders, attorneys and the like
were all at arms length ( R. 340) . None of the sponsor:1
or trustees had any financial interest in any of the transactions involved in the construction of Friendship :\Ianor
( R. 339-340). Construction was substantially completed
and the first tenants moved in on August 15, 1967 (R
337) . Occupancy has continued to rise steadily since
then and approximately 99% of the units are now occupied ( R. 482) . In the early days of Friendship l\Ianor' s operation some persons who would not qualify as
elderly or handicapped were admitted as tenants because
of the need to fill the space to permit it to operate (R.
361-362). However, the number of such persons has
steadily decreased and at the present time there are not
more than five apartments occupied by such persons (R.
483). Regulations of the FHA permit occupancy of as
much as 20 % of the units by persons who are not elderly
or handicapped ( R. 434). It is plaintiff's policy to keep
the number of such persons at a minimum (R. 362, 48:2).
The building was designed and constructed for the
safety and convenience of elderly persons ( R. 363, 484<).
It is not necessary for tenants to climb stairs in order to
enter the building ( R. 484) . There are elevators to all
floors which have been adjusted to accommodate slower
ingress and egress and all floors are carpeted ( R. 484) ·
Grab rails have been installed in all of the bathrooms
( R. 363) . There is an alarm in each room which permits
tenants to contact the desk should an emergency occur
at any time during the day or night (R. 485). Records
6

relating to the tenants' health problems, personal physic;an and the like are maintained so that assistance can be
gi\'Cll in case of an emergency (R. 485). Friendship
:ilanor was designed to provide a complete living experience for senior citizens. The .l\'1anor includes a dining
room, library and reading rooms, beauty shop, lounge
and recreation areas (R. 359-360, R. 483-486). Programs of a cultural or social nature such as music, art,
and lectures are scheduled at least once a week ( R. 364) .
\'arious craft groups meet at the Manor and the tenants
uften play cards, bingo or the like ( R. 364). In order to
insure that the tenants obtain proper nutrition and to
encourage them to mix periodically with others, the l\fanor requires that each tenant take at least one meal per
<lay in the dining room ( R. 360) .
There are 228 units in the _Manor, including 77 studio
apartments (single rooms with bath and closet with no
kitchen), 88 efficiency apartments (like the studio
apartments but with kitchens), 39 single bedroom apartments, 11 two bedroom apartments and 5 single bedroom
and 3 two bedroom apartments on the top floor (R. 3583.59). In renting the apartments it is the practice of
plaintiff to make extra charges for balconies-present
on some of the apartments-and to add one dollar per
floor above the second (R. 373). This scaling of rentals
permits the l\ianor to offer some space at rates lower
than if all the rental prices were averaged (R. 393).
All amounts received from the rental of the apartments are used for maintenance, operations, and pay7

ment on the mortgage and for no other purpose (R.
398).

Approximately 45 apartments are set aside for a
rent supplement program sponsored by the federal government to assist elderly persons with low income (R
362) . As this program limits the maximum charge that
may be made on apartments coming within the program,
rentals on some of the apartments had to be reduced (R.
392) . While the policy of plaintiff is to accept only tenants who have the ability to pay the rental charge there
have been no evictions for failure to pay rent (R. 379,
502).

Dr. Victor Kassel, an internist-psychiatrist specializing in the practice of geriatrics, has placed a number
of his patients in Friendship Manor and has found that
it has been beneficial to them (R. 413-414). While the
Manor represents a more structured environment than
the private home, it is less structured than a nursing
home (R. 401). One of the concerns of the geriatrician
is to prevent the elderly from having to enter a nursing
home too early in life (R. 400). The major problem of
the aged does not represent medical or surgical diff iculties, according to Dr. Kassel, but basically social diffi.
culties, boredom, depression, and consequent malnutri·
tion (R. 400-401). One of the principal services rendered
by Friendship Manor is the whole attitude of concern
about the elderly individual in getting him to feel that he
is an important person in society. This is an attitude that
prevails in the environment of Friendship Manor (R.
8

.J.07) . Concern for the elderly individual and his prob-

lems is more important than technical training for persons in charge of this type of facility (R. 412-413).
Friendship lVIanor has developed an attitude of overand assuming responsibility toward tenants, but
not carrying responsibility so far that tenants feel incompetent ( R. 403) . Development programs, the requirement that individuals eat one good meal per day,
the ability to call for help, the development of an enrironment in which "milieu therapy" may be effective,
encouraging of hobby activity and the general attitudes
of emphathy and concern (R. 412) have made Friendship l\Ianor a desirable place in which to care fur those
elderly persons who are not ready to abandon society for
a nursing home.
Dr. Horace ,;v, Doty, chief of geriatric services at
Utah State Hospital (R. 415), agreed with Dr. Kassel
regarding the benefits of Friendship Manor. He foun<l
the facilities for socialization of the elderly at the .Manor
to be the best he had ever encountered (R. 417). He
stated that one of the greatest evils was the tendency of
the old to isolate themselves and to recoil from others
(R. 417) . Three elderly patients from Utah State Hospital have been sent to Friendship l\lanor. None has returned, and their lives have been enriched by their residence in the Manor (R. 417).
From its inception, plaintiff worked closely with
Salt Lake County for the purpose of obtaining a determination as to the tax exempt status of Friendship
9

lVIanor (R. 342). On March 25, 1964, the Salt Lakt
County Attorney advised the county assessor that under
the proposed use, plaintiff was eligible for an exemptiou
in that its property would be used exclusively for charitable purposes (R. 448-450). As a result the county
assessor notified the FHA by letter that Friendship
lVIanor would be eligible for exemption from ad valorem
taxes after commencement of construction ( R. 443, Ex.
P. 3).
The 1967 taxes on the Manor were abate<l and 111
1968 the exemption was again considered by Salt Lake
County Commission (Ex. P. 7) . In December, 1908,
the present county attorney issued an opinion that
:Friendship :Manor should be placed on the tax exempt
rolls and all taxes shown thereon as unpaid should be
abated (Ex. P-6, R. 450). The county commission on
December 4, 1968, did abate the taxes and directed that
the property be placed on the tax exempt rolls (Ex. P7). Thereafter on January 2, 1969, the State Tax Com·
mission issued a "directive order" (Ex. P-8) stating that
Friendship Manor was not on the assessment rolls. Purporting to act under the provisions of 59-7-13 Utah Code
Annotated 1953 the Commission "authorized and directed" the county assessor and the county board of
equalization "to enter the assessment of Friendship
.l\lanor * * * on the assessment rolls for the year 1968
and such future years until such times as the Utah State
Tax Commission or some court of competent jurisdiction
directs otherwise." (Ex. P-20.)
10

The directive order of the Tax Commission was
issued without the commission having given any notice or
hearmg to plaintiff with respect to the procedure to reroke tax exemptions or having adopted any rules or regulations governing the administration of tax exempt
property (R. 513-516). In fact, shortly before the action
11as taken with respect to plaintiff, the \Veber County
Taxing authorities had requested an opinion from the
Ctah Attorney General respecting a similar home for
the elderly and had been advised that the property was
exempt from the ad valorem tax (Ex. P-22, R. 508).
The present case appears to be the only one in which the
commission has directed county taxing authorities to
rescind a tax exemption which had previously been
granted by the county taxing authorities ( R. 514-516) .

ARGUlVIENT

I
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S
PROPERTY (AT LEAST TO THE EXTENT
IT IS NOT OCCUPIED BY PERSONS UNDER
G:? OR NOT HANDICAPPED) IS USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES
AND THUS EXEMPT FROM: THE AD VALOREl\11 TAX.
C nder Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution,
the legislature is empowered to exempt some property
11

from the ad valorem tax. Other property, including that
"used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable purposes" is exempted by the constitution itself.
The question of whether providing housing for the
elderly constitutes a charitable purpose does not appear
to have been considered by this court. Nonetheless the
court has, in several decisions, examined the general coHcept of "charitable purpose" as well as that of "exclusire
use." I ts expressed philosophy in these decisions becomes
very important in considering the persuasiveness of cases
from other jurisdictions which have dealt directly wid1
housing for the elderly. There are some cases from other
jurisdictions which support plaintiff and some which do '
not. But if the basic concepts established by this court in
its prior decisions are considered, as they should be, the
cases which support plaintiff are more persuasive.
An early Utah case is Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah
332, 64 Pac. 961 ( 1901). The upper floor of a building
owned by the LDS Relief Society was used by the
ciety for its meetings and work in furtherance of its
charitable purposes. The lower floor contained two
rooms, one of which was rented and one which was for
rent but vacant. The county assessor contended that the
property was not being used exclusively for charitable
purposes because half was rented or available for rent
commercially. The court recognized that the rented portion was not. being used for charitable purposes but helrl
that the assessor should divide the property for taxation
purposes and exempt that portion which was being sn
12

used. The court pointed out that while the portion could
not be separated by definite lines this was no obstacle to
the rnluation of such portion for the purposes of taxation.

In Salt Lake Lodge No. 83 BPOE v. Groesbeck,
J.O Utah 1, 120 Pac. 192 ( 1911) , an action to recover
taxes paid under protest, the terms "charitable purpose"
an<l "exclusively" were considered in a more complex
c:ontext. The county assessor held the Elks Lodge to be
to the ad valorem tax largely because the building was used for a variety of purposes, including maintenance of a cafe where liquors, food, refreshments and
cigars were sold for a profit to its members. 'The lodge
also maintained rooms where billiards and cards were
played. This court again reversed the trial court's denial
of a tax exemption and in doing so aligned itself with
those courts which construe charitable exemptions liberally. The court said:
"The general rule is that when private property
is claimed to be exempt from taxation the law
under which the exemption is claimed will be
strictly construed * * * there is, however, an exception to this general rule, and statutes exempting property used for educational and charitable
purposes or for public worship, nnder the great
weight of authority, should receive a broad and
more liberal construction than those exempting
property used with the view to gain or profit
only. 'The reason for the rule is that the state, by
exempting property used exclusively for one or
more of the purposes mentioned from taxation,
is presumed to receive benefits from the property

13

equivalent at least to the public revenue that
would otherwise be derived from it." ( :E.mphasis
added.)
Recognizing that the exemption depends upon the
use to which the property itself is devoted, the court
nevertheless regarded the character of the organization
as significant where some of the uses of the building
were not strictly charitable. It said:

"It is a matter of common knowledge that the
charity dispensed by fraternal orders and socie·
ties and other like charitable institutions does not
consist alone of the material assistance represented in dollars and cents. They give to the
orphan, indigent poor, the sick and afflicted who ,
may be in need of help by furnishing them with
food, clothing, shelter and medical aid, but that
they also bestow other kinds of charity which in
many cases are just as essential and just as
potent in their effect for doing good and relieving distress as is the material assistance rendered
by them. 'Ve refer to the charity which is an embodiment of sympathy and kindness * * *"

The court recognized that patients who are sent to
private hospitals are required to pay for the nursing
care they receive and are not recipients of charity as the
term is usually used and understood, but that this does
not prevent the hospital's property from being used for
charitable purposes.
The third case dealing with the charitable pur·
poses exemption is Odd Fellows Building Association t'.
Naylor, 53 Utah 111, 177 Pac. 214 (1918). The court,
following the Quinn and Groesbeck cases, did not retreat

14

from its view that charitable exemptions should be liberally construed.
That the non-profit character of the property used
is one factor to be considered was recognized by the court
in JVilliam Budge hlemorial Hospital v. 1Vlaughan, 79
Uah 516, 3 P.2d 258 ( 1931), which involved the taxahility of a privately owned hospital. The plaintiff's
theory was that the hospital was used exclusively for
charitable purposes and was therefore exempt from taxation. The court held otherwise. It said that the hospital
was a business enterprise and not a non-profit organi:wlion. In doing so it placed emphasis upon the purposes
for which the hospital was organized and permissible
under its articles of incorporation rather than whether it
had in fact made a profit in operation of the hospital.
\Vhile the foregoing cases do not establish all of the
t:riteria for determining tax exempt status, they are important because they do establish that under Utah law
( 1) the exemption of property being used for "charitable purposes" should be liberally, rather than strictly,
t:onstrued ; ( 2) if a portion of a building is used for charitable and another portion for non-charitable purposes
the taxing authority should divide the property and tax
only that used for non-charitable purposes; ( 3) the
character of the organization, while not controlling, is
factor in determining whether the property is
being used for charitable purposes; and ( 4) charity is
not limited to almsgiving. These principles must be kept
in min<l in determining the weight to be given cases from
15

other states which have dealt specifically with housing
for the elderly.
A leading case is In re Henderson's Estate, 17 Cal.
2d 853, 112 P.2d 605 (1941). The court therein stated:
"The bequest in the present case was clearly
made for a charitable purpose. Since the
'
actment of the Statute of Charitable Uses, during the reign of Elizabeth, aid to the aged and
infirm has been recognized as charitable. * * *
Relief of poverty is not a condition of charitable
assistance. If a benefit conferred has a sufficiently
widespread social value, a charitable purpose
exists. ***It is a matter of common knowledge
that aged people require care and attention apart
from financial assistance, and to supply this care
and attention is as much a charitable and benevolent purpose as relief of their financial wants.
Every civilized community must provide facilities, either public or private, for the care of old '
people, regardless of financial condition, and a
bequest to such an institution to further its purposes is of enough social value to be designated
as charitable. * * *
1

" * * * A gift to support an institution bene·
ficial to the community is charitable even though
the inmates may pay fees or contribute to the
expense of maintaining the institution so long '
as the income thus derived is used only to maintain the institution or for some other charitable
purpose. * * * Thus students at a private school
may be required to pay tuition fees to cover the
cost of their instruction; yet a gift to such a
school for the purpose of assisting in the educa:,
tion of its students is clearly charitable. * * *
16

Subsequently, in Fredericka Home for the Aged v.
San Diego County, 35 Cal. 2d 789, 121 P.2d 68 ( 1950)
the court considered the taxability of a non-profit corporation operating a home for the elderly on a "life-care
contract" basis. The primary challenge made by the taxiug authority was that the plaintiff was not a charitable
institution because it did not extend free services to the
poor. The court said:

" * * * but the welfare exemption law * * *
makes no such requirement as a qualifying factor
for the tax exemption, and if such condition
were intended, appropriate language to that
effect could readily have been adopted. Rather,
the welfare exemption law as here involved appears to rest on the concept of charity in its ordinary sense. Consistent with such interpretation,
the controlling consideration in determining
whether an institution such as plaintiff's should
be classified as a charitable one is not whether
a few or all of the recipients of its benefits may
make reasonable contributions toward deferring
the cost of such benefits, but whether such contributions as are made do not exceed what is
required for the maintenance of the institution
at a reasonable standard and are devoted to the
purposes for which the institution was founded,
which purposes, in the absence of required contributions, would clearly be deemed to be charitable. If such is the situation then the institution
is no less a charity because of the receipt of such
contributions, and within such concept plaintiff
properly claims a tax exempt status under the
welfare exemption law."
/11 ifield Manor et al. v. County of Los Angeles, 188

17

Cal. App. 2d 1, 10 Cal. Rep. 242 ( 1961) was a more re.
cent California case involving the taxability of three separate housing projects for elderly persons, which utilize<l
life-care contracts. In arguing that the properties were
not exempt, the county emphasized the fact that the
homes contained "luxury apartments" and that the fees
were not in reach of persons within moderate means. In
holding the property exempt, the court said:
"The courts have long recognized and declared
that charity is not limited to giving alms, is not
confined to relief of the poor, may extend to the
rich in areas where they are not able to care
for themselves, and extends to those social objectives which promote the general welfare and
would be served by the government in the absence of philanthropic enterprises such as homes
for the aged. Historically, and well nigh unanimously, the courts have found homes for the
aged to be charitable institutions where conducted at cost or less. * * *
"The test is not found in the question of what
financial ability does the recipient possess, but
what are his needs, alleviatoin of which constitutes a worthy social value. We apprehend that
the finanical test becomes pertinent only when
the occupants of an old age home pay more than
the cost to the home of what it furnishes them.

* * *

"In light of these authorities it seems clear that
a home for the aged which caters to wealthy
persons and furnishes them with services and
care needed by the old and infirm, rich or poor.
does not cease to be a charitable institution so
long as its charges do not yield more than actual
cost of operation; * * * "
18

California is not the only state to recognize the charitable purpose in operation of homes for the elderly.
Other states are ruling in favor of exemption in increasing numbers under varying constitutional and statutory
provisions. For example, in Bozeman Deaconess Foundation v. Ford, 439 P.2d 915 (Mont., 1968) it was held
that a home for the elderly was an institution of "purely
public charity," hence exempt from taxation under the
)lontana constitution and statute. The case involved a
two million dollar housing project, funds for which had
been borrowed from a private lender and insured by the
FHA. Tenants were required to enter into life care contracts with payments from $7,000 to $32,000, and monthly maintenance charges from $150 to $250. They were
accepted without regard to race or religion, but had to
be 62 years of age or over or chronically ill. Some persons unable to pay the full charges received assistance
from Bozeman Deaconess Foundation. In holding the
property to be tax exempt, the Montana court said:
"To qualify as a charity does not require that
it have an exclusive relationship to the poor, and
its charitable status is not destroyed by the
charging of fees for admission and maintenance.
[Citing cases.J * * *

*

*

*

*

"It may be that appellants feel the standard
of care, the excellence of accommodations, and
the mode of life accorded by this facility, all
reflected by the size of the occupancy and maintenace fees, and the physical plant facilities
available are inconsistent with the usual concept
of charity. But 'charity' to the law has a much
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broader meaning than that accorded it in common_ speech (15 Am. Jur. 2d p. 8). The scope of
charity and the standards under which it is adare
frozen by the past,. but keep
pace with the times and the new conditions and
wants of society. (Zollman American Law of
Charities, pp. 121, 123). * * *
"In Hillcrest Homes we have a facility operating without profit or profit motive, making care
available to the aged in good health and bad
under the circumstances where the fullness of
their lives is promoted and imposition of the
frailties of declining year are spared their children, relatives and the public authorities. Its
property and facilities are devoted exclusivelr
to those purposes. It is a purely public charity
in fact and not merely by legislative definition.

* * *"

The Supreme Court of Kansas held a home for the
aged to be tax exempt in Topeka Presbyterian Manor,
Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Shawnei:
County et al., 195 Kan. 90, 402 P.2d 802 (1965), under
a Kansas constitutional provision that "* * * All prop·
crty used exclusively for*** benevolent and charitable
purposes*** shall be exempted from taxation."
The case involved taxability of Topeka Presbyterian
Inc., a non-profit Kansas corporation,
which was under the management of the United Pres·
byterian Foundation, Inc. The articles provided that
upon dissolution of the manor any net assets would never
go to the resident members or contributors but would
pass to the foundation, whose assets in turn in case of dis·
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solution would go to the Synod of Kansas. The purpose
of the manor, as expressed in its articles of incorporation,
was to provide elderly persons with housing facilities
especially designed to meet the physical, social and psychological needs of the aged, and to contribute to their
health, security, happiness and usefulness in longer li,,_
ing. The trial court held, and was affirmed on appeal,
that the manor's property was "exclusively used as a
religious, charitable and benevolent home for the aged'
and therefore was exempt from taxation.
Although the Kansas Supreme Court was committed to the doctrine that exemptions from taxation
were to be strictly construed, and that the burden of
showing qualification for the exemption was upon the
taxpayer, it nevertheless held that the manor qualified
as a charity. The court rejected the contention that the
fact that an entrance fee of $2,000.00 and the sum of
$200.00 a month is sought and received in about 85%
of the cases would take the operation out of the domain
of charity. It approved an earlier holding that a hospital,
by charging patients able to pay, does not change the
charitable nature of the services rendered. Seeing no
basis for distinguishing hospitals from other charitable
11ses in this regard, the court said:
"To pinpoint the matter further, and again
without any effort to equate hospitals and homes
for the aged, the test of whether an enterprise
is charitable for ad valorem tax exemption purposes is whether its property is used to carry
out a purpose recognized in law as charitable.

***
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"Traditionally special concern has been shown
the. aged: .Their peculiar needs arising out
of the mfirm1hes of body, mind and spirit that
come with advanced age have received the attention of government of all levels and of citizens
generally. * * *
"Financial standing is not necessarily a criterion. Long ago this court * * * quoted with
approval the classic definition of Lord Cam<len,
Eighteenth Century Chancellor of England,
that charity is 'a gift to the general public use,
which extends to the poor as well as to the rich.'

* * *

"Many of the people who have been or will be
received in the Manor, where the average is said
to be 82, will in the main be self-supporting
persons who would not be willing to be classified
as recipients of charity in the ordinary meaning
of that term, yet the state does have a distinct
interest in the well being of this class of citizens
by reason of their advanced age. In any event,
insofar as :Manor is concerned, it appears that
its services are available to people of limited
means and no more than a reasonable standard
of care is provided."

1

In Memorial Hospi,tal v. C. L. Sparks, et al., 9
Ariz. App. 478, 453 P.2d 989 (1969) the Court of Ap· ,
peals of Arizona held that the Memorial Senior Citizens
Towers, a housing facility owned and operated by the
plaintiff was entitled to an exemption from real property
tax. The court noted that the plaintiff was a tax exempt
non-profit corporation whose principal purpose had been
the operation of a hospital, and that the hospital depended upon fees from patients to maintain operations. The
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housing facility, built with direct loan of $1,816,000 from
a federal agency, consisted of two ten-story buildings
containing 153 apartments built for elderly families or
persons.
llefore obtaining the loan, plaintiff had obtained a
written statement from the county assessor that the
Towers would be "exempt from ad valorem tax as a hospital operation." Persons admitted to the Towers were
required to pay their rent. There was some testimony,
however, that after a tenant had been admitted, the hospital would sometimes subsidize him by carrying him
when he was unable to pay his rent. No one had been admitted who had indicated an inability to pay rent although most had small incomes.
The applicable tax provision, Arizona Revised Statutes s42-271, provided:
"All property in the state shall be subject to
taxation, except: * ·* * (4) hospitals, asylums,
poor houses and other charitable institutions for
relief of the indigent or afflicted, and the lands
appurtenant thereto, with their fixtures and
equipment, not used or held for profit."
The Arizona court noted that exemptions from taxation are the exception and not the rule, but nonetheless
said:
"Without selecting any one indicia we believe
that the sum total of the uses to which the Towers
are put indicate that it is a charitable institution
within the meaning of the Arizona Constitution
and the Arizona Revised Statutes. It is true that
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upon first application the hospital requires some
of
supp?rt from the people rnakmg
application to rent. lhe operation is structured
to a class of people who under normal
would not be able to receive the type of accommodations provided. It is also just as clear that
this is not a facility designed for profit. * * *
"This court is not in a position to determine
what the future status of this property would
be should the mortgage be paid off completely
and the hospital should attempt to make a profit
from the rentals. \Ve can only say under the
facts in this case that the hospital has shown
sufficient evidence to justify the tax exempt
status."

In re Tax A.ppeals of the United Presbyterian
Homes, 428 Pa. 145, 236 A.2d 776 (1968) involved a
home for the elderly operated by a non-profit corporation formed "for the purpose of establishing and maintaining homes for the aged or other dependent persons.
***"The corporation acquired a former hotel and reno- '
vated it for such use. Admission to the home was generally limited to applicants who were at least 65 years
of age. In upholding a lower court decision that the facility was exempt from taxation, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania said:

1

" * * * For centuries, and in nearly every civilized
country, the care of the aged has been considered
charitable. Moreover, the social need of goYernmental and charitable caring for the aged.
as well as the importance and necessity for such
a benevolent public policy, have become
recognized and accepted, as medical science 1n
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the United States constantly lengthens life expectancy with its resulting increase in the number
of needy aged. The elderly, even those who are
not completely incapacitated physically, suffer
from loneliness, and from mental and physical
infirmities which tend to increase as they grow
older and their children leave the family home
and their contemporaries move away or die."
Rejecting the argument that payment for the services took the home out of the charitable class, the court
noted that no profits could ever go to an individual or to
a corporation operated for private profit. It added:
"To adopt this a:rgument of appellants would
require us to hold that whenever a non-profit
institution made a charge for its care or services
to any resident or patient, the institution would
be precluded from obtaining tax exemption. Consequently, hospitals which charge large sums
for the care of and service to paying patients,
and colleges and universities which charge tuition to countless students, would not be entitled
to real estate tax exemption."

In Milwaukee Protestant Home for the Aged v.
City of Milwaukee, 41 Wisc. 2d 284, 164 N.W.2d 289

( 1969) the trial court held a home for the aged subject

to tax, largely on the ground that the charges exceeded
the operating costs, the surplus being paid into an enJowment fund of the corporation. In reversing, the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff was a non-profit
corporation, that no part of its earnings would inure to
the benefit of its members, directors, or officers and that
thr directors and officers did not receive any compensa-
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tion for their services. Although the Wisconsin exemption referred to "benevolent" rather than charitable uses
the court noted that a broad construction of the tern;
charitable would make it equivalent to benevolent. In
holding that plaintiff was entitled to a tax exemption tht
court said:

"Recent decades have added new dimensions to
retirement living. Old age and survivors benefits under the Social Security Act, combined
with pvivate annuities and industrial pension
plans have provided most older persons in the
nation an assured income for their retirement
years. Many Americans retire earlier than they 1
once did and most Americans retire with at least
modest incomes available for their retirement
living. Such retirees are not sick, not senile,
not penniless. However, they do face a variety
of personal and interpersonal problems, not
necessarily economical in nature. An increasing )
number of retired persons seek the type of congregate living and retirement homes that will
provide companionship, maintain self-respect
and offer protection against the ravages that
declining years may bring.
"To meet the needs, wants and expectations of
such retired persons, retirement homes for the
haNe developed, either as
'
institutions or as wings or additions to ex1stmg
homes for the aged. Such retirement homes for
the aged are not primarily nursing homes or
hospitals. They are not almshouses,
residents do not consider themselves obJects of
public or private charity. They are what the
name implies, homes for retired persons,
of congregate living where retirees go to liH.
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expecting to pay the fees charged and to receive
the usual incidents of group home living."
Another case is Electra Arms Apartment and Medical Center Foundation, Inc., v. City of Wilmington, 254
A.2d 244 (Del., 1969). The case involved a corporation
which was dedicated to non-profit charitable purposes,
incorporated for the purpose of providing living quarters for the elderly persons. In upholding the tax exemption the Supreme Court of Delaware noted:
"The record shows that the apartment was designed and managed in such a way as to carry
out the purposes of Electra's charter and bylaws. In design, it contained many features to
meet the particular needs of elderly or handicapped persons. Bathrooms and other places
of possible danger were furnished with handrails to prevent falls. Laundry facilities were
provided on each floor. There were special recreation areas, including card rooms, a television
lounge, and exercise rooms. The living units had
individual electric climate controls. There was
a library in the building for the use of the tenants.
They were provided 24-hour security guard
coverage, as well as 24-hour switchboard operation, to make sure the tenants would have assistance available any time needed. On the staff,
there was a full-time trained social worker to
assist the tenants with their problems. A civic
organization composed of residents was
lished; it met regularly and planned acti.v1bes
of various types for the elderly tenants m an
effort to prevent 'retirement shock.' Arrangements were made whereby tenants would check
with one another early each day in order that
any problems could be discovered promptly. A
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dining room and coffee shop were operated bi
Electra in the building, principally for the
fit of the tenants, as were a barber shop an<l a
beauty salon. There was also a pharmacy, in
which Electra owned 40% of the stock, where
tenants could purchase medicine and other neeJs
at a substantial discount. The rentals paid h\
tenants included all of these facilities, as weil
as the utilities.

*

*

*

"There was no discrimination of any nature in
the selection of tenants, save that the operators
tried to limit occupancy to persons 62 years of
age or older. In the beginning, about 70 apart·
ments were rented to younger people simply
because vacancies existed and Electra needed the
income from those quarters. Later, however, 30
of those tenants were evicted upon the expiration
of their leases. Of the older tenants, all but 8
were retired.
"The city first contends that Electra was not
created and operated for a charitable purpose. '
This contention is not based upon any suggestion that relief of the aged or handicapped is not
a recognized charitable purpose. * * * It is based
on the suggestion that, after the life of the mort·
gage, Electra's charter could be
so
as to eliminate the non-profit and charitable
aspect, after which the corporation could be
used for any purpose desired by the spo!1sors.
The record contains nothing to suggest an
to make any such change; certainly the
bility of future change does not eliminate its
charitable status during the time it was operat·
ing. In any event, the property itself has
sold at substantial loss; what Electra may do ill
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the future has no bearing upon its past operations.
"The city also seizes upon the fact that a certain
number of apartments were leased to tenants
under the age of 62, most of whom were gainfully employed. As we have pointed out, this
was purely a temporary measure adopted only
because those rooms were vacant and Electra
needed the income to carry on the project. .Many
of those younger tenants were ousted upon the
termination of their leases. 'Ve do not consider
this partial departure from Electra's basic purpose, caused by the need of revenue, to be suff icient to exclude Electra from the category of a
charitable enterprise. * * *"
\\Tith respect to the contention of the city that the
amortization of the mortgage through the payments for
care and services required a holding that the corporation
was holding the property for investment, the court said:
"'Ve do not think, however, that this factor
alone requires a holding that the property was
held for investment, when considered in light
of all the other facts. Electra had to borrow a
great deal of its money in order to create the
kind of place needed for those people whom it
wanted to benefit. We have no doubt that some
kind of amortization had to be arranged in order
to secure those funds. We cannot adopt a rule
which would bar charities from receiving the
benefits of this statute simply because they must
borrow money in order to exist.
"We must remember, also, that the schedule of
rentals is obviously designed to provide no benefit for Electra, but simply to enable it to 'break
even. ' "
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In State Board of Tax Commissioners et al. v. The
Metlwdist Home for the Aged of the Indiana Conference of the iJ.'lethodist Church, Inc., 241N.E.2d84 (Ind.
App., 1968), a retirement home for the aged was held
to be exempt from the property tax although a majority
of the persons entering the home were required to make
an average payment in the sum of $9,500.00 and, in addition, if financially able, to pay a monthly charge for
their care, including their meals. In holding the home ti:
be exempt from taxation, the Appellate Court of Indiana said:

'' * ·:+:· * The home is meeting the needs whieh
gerontoligists state must be provided the aging,
namely: relief of loneliness, boredom, decent
housing that has safety and convenience and is
adapted to age, security, well being, emotional
stability, attention to problems of health, etc."
The foregoing views that providing housing for the
elderly constitutes a "charitable purpose" are buttressed
by the declarations and enactments of the Congress of the
United States. In the 'Vhite House Conference on Aging Act (P.L. 85-908, 72 Stat. 1746) enacted September
2, 1958, we find the following:

1

i

"The Congress hereby finds and declares
public interest requires enactment of
to fonnulate recommendations for immed1ate
action in improving and developing programs '
to permit the country to take advantage ?f the
experience and skills of the older persons m our
population, to create conditions which will better
enable them to meet their needs, and to further
research on aging because- * * *
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( 4) Our failure to provide adequate housing
for elderly persons at costs which can be met
by them is perpetuating slum conditions in
many of our cities and smaller communities
and is forcing many older persons to live under
conditions in which they cannot maintain decency and health or continue to participate
in the organized life of the community; * * *

( 7) \Ve may expect average length of life
and the number of older people to increase still
further, we must proceed with all possible
speed to correct these conditions and to create
a social, economic, and health climate which
will permit our middle aged and older people
to continue to lead proud and independent
lives which will restore and rehabilitate many
of them to useful and dignified positions
among their neighbors; which will enhance
the vigor and vitality of the communities and
of our total economy; and which will
further aggravation of their problems with
resulting increased social, financial, and medical burdens."

Following its recitals as to the need for legislation,
the act contains a Declaration of Policy which recognizes
the need for a joint state and federal effort aimed at proriding housing for the elderly at prices they can afford
to pay.

ln Senate Report No. 2049 published in connection
with the Senior Citizens Housing Act of 1962, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency pointed out
problems resulting from the increasing average age of
our population:
31

"Twenty one million people are now 6:!
of _age
and by 1980 there will be at.least
thirty m1lbon people in this age group. Toda\
one out of three persons reaching the age of (iO
has a parent or close relative over 80, and iu just
40 years this ratio will rise to two out of u;ree.
Soon our society will have not one, but two generations of senior citizens.
"In our society the aged have unique soeial
and economic problems. l\'lost older persons are
mobile and able to care for themselves with a
minimum of help even \vhen disabled. Howerer.
8 out of 10 do have one or more chronic
they spend twice as many days per year in hos
pitals as do those under 65; and they have diseases of the circulatory system at three tin1e1
the rate of younger age groups. Access to medi·
cal and health facilities and physical design to
compensate for disability are prime requiremenb
for housing older persons. * * * At this stage.
much of the existing housing occupied by senior
citizens is too large, too old, too costly, or to11
inefficient, and unsafe for the changes which
occur with age. * * *
"Housing for the nation's senior citizens th.us
constitutes a special problem requiring special
attention. Housing for senior citizens must be
adapted to the physical, psychological, and eco:.
nomic changes which take place with age. * * *

1

The foregoing cases establish beyond a doubt that
providing housing for the elderly is a charitable purpose
and properly so used should be tax exempt unless tak.en
out of the charitable category by some proscribed actir·.
.
ity, such as making private
pro f.it, or f a1·1ure t o use the
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property "exclusively" for the avowed charitable purpose.
But there is nothing in plaintiff's method of operation which is proscribed. Charging fees is permissible.
So is amortization of the mortgage so long as it is not for
priyate gain. Contributions have been made by plaintiff,
its sponsors and their members, by way of time, effort,
and money. Activities such as recreation, and operation
uf laundry facilities, convenience shops, and the like, are
incidental to and necessary for the charitable use. As
pointed out in Electra Arms, supra., the renting of an
insignificant number of units to non-qualifying persons
-necessary as a temporary measure-does not take
away the exemption. In any event, under the rule in
Parker v. Quinn, supra., it was proper for the trial court
to order such areas segregated and separately assessed.

Under the foregoing cases, many of the things upon
which defendants place great reliance are not material.
For example, defendants proceed upon the basis that
"charitable" means almsgiving and place reliance upon
decisions from other states offering that approach. Also
they seem to feel that religious organizations must fi·
,. nancially carry an endeavor before it can receive a charitable (or perhaps religious) exemption. Thus, defendat ants in their brief, place considerable emphasis upon such
e.
factors as whether the institution is obligated to care for
u lenants when thev are no longer financially able to pay,
\'· 11·hether the cha;ity dispenses relief to those in need,
hr · whether plaintiff or the sponsoring churches have do33

nated funds to launch the project or whether people do.
nate their time to run the manor. In their statement ol I
facts, defendants devote substantial time in an effort t1,
demonstrate that the $25,000.00 note given to Chuckrow:
Construction Company was not a contribution by plaintiff, that its tenants maximum income is not restricttJ
and that they have to pay rent. A number of wiirn:s.le,
were in fact called by defendants at the trial to testily
merely to these latter two matters. They are readily couceeded by plaintiff.
Defendants also argue that full time employees oi
the plaintiff are paid, although they overlook the far,
that that the members of the board of trustees and mem· !
hers of the sponsoring churches donated considerable·
time in organizing and operating the l\1anor, and that
they work without pay. Defendants' theory is summed
up in its brief (p. 32) with the statement that tenants ol
Friendship Manor are paying for all services ren·
dered and performed. Thus they reason,
Manor is "giving nothing." However, defendants' anti·
quated almsgiving theory was unequivocally rejecte<l b)
this court in Salt Lake Lodge No. 85, BPOE v. Groe-1·
beck, supra. There it held that a broad liberal interpre·
tation is to be used in determining what enterprises fall
within the term "charitable" and that requiring payment
for services does not necessarily disqualify an institution
Further, Groesbeck shows that incidental uses to which
a building may be put, although not strictly charitable
in themselves, will not deprive an organization of an es·
emption if these incidental uses tend to directly further
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the charitable purpose and are not designed to deriYe a
profit or income. Thus, even though .Friendship .:Manor
rents space to a beauty shop, drug store and doctor, the
object is not to produce revenue but to provide necessary
service to the tenants. As stated by Reverand Bliss, these
facilities are needed to provide a total living experience
for the senior citizens.
Defendants also contend, in their brief, that Utah's
eonstitutional and statutory provisions exempting property used exclusively for charitable purposes should be
strictly construed. To support their contention they rely
upon language in Parker v. Quinn, and, Odd
Buildiny Association v. Naylor, supra, two cases which
were concerned not with whether particular activities
were charitable, but with whether a charitable use of income from property was equivalent to a charitable use of
the property itself. And that is all the court was talking
about in terms of "strict" construction.
However, in determining what uses of property are
charitable, a liberal interpretation is given to the statute.
Enterprises which are not "charitable" under the traditional almsgiving concept may be charitable under
Utah's constitutional provision. That totally new types
uf endeavors may be charitable, even though there is no
precedent for an exemption, is clearly the proposition
for which Salt Lake Lodge No. 85 BPOE v. Groesbech',
supra., stands.
Defendants place emphasis upon language regardthe destitute, the helpless orphan and the poor (Def.
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Brief p. 23) . But how they can consider such language ,
as a significant statement of the holding of the case 1
difficult to understand. The case in fact held directly lv
the contrary, as evidenced by the quotation from Groes- :
back cited supra (p. 13). The court expressly recognizeJ
that charity is not limited to relief of the poor, sick or
indigent.

Defendants also cite as "a very significant stak
ment" from Odd Fellows Building Association r. ·
Naylor, supra., to the effect that the exemption pri1ilege is extended to property without regard to the char·
acter of its owner. Plaintiff would agree with this state- :
ment, but does not understand how it helps defendants .
1
unless they are saying that it makes no difference that
plaintiff is a non-profit corporation. Plaintiff submits.
however, that in this regard the character of the owner·
profit or non-profit making-may be very important as i1
recognized by cases from this and other jurisdictions.
This constitutes the basis of the most obvious rebuttal tli
defendants' vigorous argument that the Newhouse Hole!
is paying taxes and is similar in operation to plaintiff
Apart from arguments that there are substantial differ·
ences in operation and that the only basis for the state·
ment that its property is taxable is the testimony of it:
manager, is the singularly important fact that the New·
house Hotel is being operated for profit, whereas
Friendship Manor is not.

1

I

Defendants also rely heavily upon the facts tha:,
plaintiff does not limit its occupancy to tenants haying

36

incomes less than a maximum amount and that some
tenants have income of more than $5,000.00 a year. This
should not be a controlling factor. Friendship Manor is
ucither a convalescent home nor a poor house. However,
it is without profit, providing a service to a vastly increasing segment of our society, senior citizens with
moderate income who require something apart from
financial assistance.

1

1

1

1

The decisions from many jurisdictions cited above
recognize that furnishing such services on a non-profit
basis is a charitable activity. Moreover, as can be seen
from an exhibit admitted in evidence (Ex. P-19) , the
income of a great many of the tenants of the )lanor is
my modest indeed. From the same exhibit, it can also
be seen that while the minimum age is 62 years, an age
'i1hich few would regard as being elderly, the actual age
uf the tenants covered on a random basis is much higher.

Another concept of defendants' evidenced not only
in their brief but throughout the trial of this case is that
lhere must be a donation of property by the more fortunate to the less fortunate in order to constitute a charitable purpose. They cannot conceive that where the
tenants are paying for some of the services they receive
that a charitable purpose could exist. But as recognized
s in many of the cases cited above, there are various examples of persons paying for services to an organization
:hat is charitable. Most patients in a hospital pay for the
i! , 'ervices they receive. Defendants comment that the
tenants of Friendship Manor would not consider them37

selves objects of charity. Anyone who has paid a hospital ,
bill recently would not likely consider himself an obJeci 1
of charity either. Nonetheless hospitals operated 011 a
non-profit basis have traditionally been given a churit. ,
able exemption. Students pay tiuition to schools, collegei
and universities. This does not prevent the schools frorn
obtaining a charitable exemption. Patients at a nurs 111g
home do likewise. Of course, if the nursing home is operated as a profit making organization the exemption
would not be allowed. This distinction is recognized by
the tax commission in its directives to assessors (Ex. 11- ·
27-P-28).

Defendants cite a number of cases in support of }
their contention that the operation of homes such as ·
Friendship l\Ianor for the elderly, do not constitute a
charitable use. Admittedly, some of these cases are op·
posed to those relied upon by plaintiff. 'Vhile some art
distinguishable on their facts, others are distinguishable.
primarily on the basis that the jurisdiction in which thty
were decided had theretofore adopted a policy regarding
charitable uses which differ from that adopted by U11 1
court.

Defendants place considerable reliance upon a New
lVIexico case, Mou,ntain View Homes, Inc. v. State TM
Commission, 77 N.M. 649, 427 P.2d 13 (1947). How·
ever, the facility involved in the case was constructed t
"* * * provide dwelling accommodations for moderate to '
low-income families and for families displaced by urball
renewal areas." The residents of the facility were pri·
11
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marily skilled and unskilled workers, military personnel,
students, teachers and pesrons of advanced years. The
arerage age of the tenants in the project was found to be
years. Thus, it can readily be seen that the facility is
not comparable to Friendship l\!Ianor. The tenants were
not primarily elderly persons with special needs which
the facility was designed to handle, and the project was
not oriented toward creating an environment especially
to the special physical, psychological and social
needs of the elderly. The case is readily distinguishable
trom the present one.
Defendants next cite United Presbyterian Association v. Board of County Commissioners, .... Colo ..... ,
+-18 P .2d 967 ( 1969) . There the facility involved, was
comparable to Friendship Manor and designed for substantially the same purposes. However, the Colorado approach to charitable exemption is quite different from
Utah's.

Utah is liberal in determining what uses are char, itable in themselves and fairly strict in limiting the methods utilized to reach the charitable end; whereas Colorado strictly limits the end but is liberal in permitting the
·' means to an end which has been adjudged charitable.
1
Cases cited in United Presbyterian indicate that Colo>·
rado would allow an exemption where the profits of a
1
1
non-charitable enterprise are donated to charity, but
t would almost require the charity itself to be of a tradi111
tional almsgiving type. Commenting on this case, de1· fendants state that if Friendship Manor were not tax
11
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exempt, rentals would have to be increased to meet the
taxes. Since the plaintiff is now making no profit, this ii
axiomatic. Rentals would have to be increased by an ay.
erage of approximately $20.00 per month. Plaintiff submits that if this did not bankrupt plaintiff, it would hare
the effect of forcing many of the tenants out of the
.:Manor into situations where the total impact on the state
could cost it more than loss of tax revenues. Tenants who
are making $200.00 per month or less (and Exhibit p.
19 shows many of them are) could not stand a $20.00 a
month increase in rentals.
Another case upon which defendants rely is Hilltop
Village, Inc. v. I(errville Independent School Dist.,
______ Tex. ______ , 426 S.W.2d 943 ( 1968). The relevant
Texas statute provided as follows:

"All buildings belonging to institutions of purely,
public charity * * * an institution of purely
public charity is one which dispenses its aid to
its members and others in sickness or distress,:
or at death, without regard to poverty or riches.
of the recipient, also when the funds, property:
and assets of such institutions are placed ana I
bound by its laws to relieve, aid and
in any way to the relief of its members when II1
want, sickness and distress, and provide home)
fo rits helpless and dependent members and to
educate and maintain the orphans of its deceaseo
members or other persons." [Emphasis added.!
I

It would appear that the Texas definition of "char·
ity," unlike Utah's is based on the almsgiving theory:
"*

*

* It is apparent that Hilltop Village
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not accepting residents without regard to their
financial circumstances nor is it bound to assume
charitable obligations or to engage in dispensing relief to those in need."
Since the Texas statute requires that aid be dispensed without regard to poverty or riches, it was appropriate for the Texas court to decide that a home admitting only those who can pay is not exempt, but there is no
reason to apply a Texas statute to a Utah case.
Defendants also note that Hilltop Village requires
1:ie assets of a charity to be pledged in perpetuity to a
1· 1writable use. Friendship Manor's assets are so pledged.
Defendants nevertheless seem to fear some future nondmritable use of the Manor's assets. The answer to this
argument is quite simple. The taxing authorities conduct annual investigations to determine whether property is being used for charitable purposes. If at some
lime they find that the Manor is not entitled to an exemption, that will be the time to deny an exemption.

Apparently it is defendants' position that a charitJ i able institution cannot borrow money to construct a
r building and then repay the loan with monies produced
11
br the operation of the facility. Such a narrow view of
1vhat qualifies as charitable is clearly rejected by the
numerous cases cited above.

r·

11

II
'l'HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PART OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY
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\¥AS SUBJECT TO TAXATION FOR 'l'HE
YEARS 1968 AND 1969.
One of the questions inherent in this appeal ll
whether the Utah State Tax Commission by administra.
tive fiat, without notice or hearing, can overrule determinations made by boards of county commissioners that
particular parcels of property are being used for elm.
itable purposes and are exempt from the ad valorem tax.
Traditionally, determination of the exempt status
of such property has been left with the county assessor'
and boards of county commissioners, and we can fin<l
nothing in the Utah constitution or statutes aimed ai
taking this power away from counties and giving it to a
state agency.
The present action arose out of a "Directive of
State Tax Commission of Utah" issued on January 2. :
1969 (Ex. P-8) , which recited that the commission had
"conducted an investigation of the 1968 assessment rolls;
of Salt Lake County" and determined that Friendship
Manor together with real property on which it is located
had escaped assessment, was not on the assessment rolls.
and was subject to taxation. On the basis of these deter·
minations it ordered as follows:
"Now, therefore, pursuant to repl. vol. Utah
Code Ann., Sec. 59-1-13 (1963) the count\
assessor, the county board of equalization, the
county auditor of Salt Lake County are hereby
authorized and directed to enter the assessmenl.
of Friendship Manor together with real property'
on which it is located on the assessment rolb
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of Salt Lake County for the year 1968 and such
future years until such time as the Utah State
Tax Commission or some court of competent
jurisdiction directs otherwise."
The statute relied upon by the Tax Commission does
nut permit the commission to single out one piece of
property and direct its taxation, but requires it to
''conduct an investigation throughout each
county of the state to determine whether all
property subject to taxation is on the assessment
roll and whether such property is being assessed
at 30% of its reasonable fair cash value."
The section goes on to provide that if it finds that
I.ere has been some property escape taxation the tax
commission shall direct the county assessor to enter the
assessment of such "escaped property."
In this case, despite its recital to the contrary, the
tax commission did not make any such investigation in
Salt Lake County and did not determine what property
had escaped assessment or which was not being assessed
at the statutory rate, but on the basis of an informal inquiry from the deputy county assessor ruled that the
plaintiff's property was subject to taxation and directed
he county to tax it (R. 513-514).
1

In Harmer v. State Tax Commission, 22 Utah 2d
.324, 452 P .2d 876 ( 1969) this court held that the tax
' rnmmission could not place an unequal tax burden upon
' tertain property owners by increasing the tax on random
, parcels without conducting a county-wide investigation.
1 Despite the broad language of 59-5-46 ( 9) Utah Code
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Annotated 1953, the tax commission was obligated tu .
follow specific procedures for equalization of taxation a) :
set out in 59-5-46.1 Utah Code Annotated 1953.

In connection with assessments of property such
plaintiff's, there is another specific section, 59-5-47 Utah
Code Annotated 1953, which provides that the state tax
commission may order or make an assessment or reassessment of any property which it deems to have been
overassessed or underassessed or which it finds has not •
been assessed. But this section requires the commission,
in order to make such assessment or reassessment, to giYC :
notice of its intention and give the property owner an
opportunity to be heard.
1

At the trial the tax commission argued that in this:·
case it was not utilizing 59-5-47 but the broad powers ol :
59-4-46 ( 9) , very much as it had argued in the Harmer l
case. The Harmer principle would seem to apply here. i
If the tax commission wants to exercise its general super·
vision over administration of the tax laws it still must do
so by following statutorily prescribed procedures.
I
The commission's reliance on 59-7-13 Utah Code I
Annotated 1953 was improper because the county-wide i
investigation had not been made. Moreover, the propert)·
had not "escaped" taxation as used in that section but
had been determined to be tax exempt by the Salt Lake,
County Board of Equalization. It has been held thal
property cannot be said to have "escaped" taxation if the
taxing authorities were aware of the property and
some action with respect to it. Escaped property is thal
1

1
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ll'hich has been overlooked. See Gully v. J. J. 1Vewnum
[,urnher Co., 178 Miss. 312, 172 So. 740 (1937) and
Adams v. Luce, 87 Miss 220, 39 So. 418 ( 419) ( 1905).
Inasmuch as the tax commission did not proceed in
a manner provided by law, and Salt Lake County did
not assess the property, it was improper for the court to
hold that the plaintiff should pay taxes on the nonexempt portions of its property for the years 1968 and
1969.

CONCLUSION
This court and many others have rejected the view
that "charity" requires something to be given to poor
people. Cases involving hospitals, schools, boy scout organizations, and the like, recognize a charitable purpose
111 many activities which in no way resemble giving of
alms to the poor.
As society changes, the concepts of charity also
l'hange. What 200 years ago would have been regarded
t·ompletely outside the orbit of government interest or
activity may have become an area of great government
rnncern. The cases cited, as well as legislative actions
taken by Utah, many other states, and the United States
Congress, demonstrate that provision of adequate lowl'ost housing for elderly persons, in an atmosphere in
"hich they may be permitted to extend the useful period
of their lives, is a matter of governmental concern. The
of such housing by non-profit corporations,
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where no profit or benefit is to be realized by the pro.
viders, is a charitable use.
The trial court was correct in holding that providing
suitable housing for the elderly is charitable, and it 11
proper to assess separately those portions of the building
which might be used for persons other than the elderJ.1
\ Vith respect to the 1968 and 1969 taxes, however, the
action of the Utah State Tax Commission in direelinu
the county to assess the property was null and void. The
taxable portions of plaintiff's property should be assessed
commencing with the year 1970.
Respectfully submitted,
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